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A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOME 
INSTRUCTION? 
NEAL DEVINS* 
Parental and scholarly dissatisfaction with the public school system 
is increasingly evident. In the spring of 1983, the National Commission 
on Educational Excellence issued A Nation at Risk, 1 a report demand-
ing the restoration of core curriculum requirements and discipline in 
our public schools. In 1981, James Coleman, a University of Chicago 
sociologist, released a study demonstrating that private schools do a 
better job educating our young than public schools do.2 These two 
studies, among other things, have led parents to reconsider the viability 
of public schools. A recent survey, for example, found that 25.5% of 
parents with school age children would send their children to private 
schools if Congress enacted President Reagan's Tuition Tax Credit 
proposaV which would allow parents a $250 tax credit for private 
school expenditures. 
The rapid growth of home instruction is one of the most dramatic 
reactions against our public schools.4 Approximately thirty thousand 
families now practice home instruction, which entails the complete re-
moval of the child from the institutional educational environment. 5 
• Staff Attorney for United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. B.A. 
Georgetown Univ.; J.D. Vanderbilt Univ. Mr. Devins completed this Article while he was Direc-
tor of the Religious Liberty and Private Education Project at Vanderbilt University. The Institute 
for Education Affairs supported the research for this project. The views expressed in this Article 
are solely those of the author. Mr. Devins would like to thank Deborah S. Vick for her thoughtful 
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I. The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative 
of Educational Reform (1983). 
2. J. COLEMAN, T. HOFFER, S . KILGORE, HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC 
AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS COMPARED (1982). 
3. Congressionally Mandated Study of School Finance Final Report: Vol. 2, Private Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education, Report to Congress from Secretary of Education, 68 (1983). 
4. Similar to the home study movement in its criticism of public education is the Christian 
day school movement. Christian day schools, with current enrollments of approximately one mil-
lion students, are the fastest growing segment of institutional private education. For a general 
discussion of Christian school opposition to public education, see Carper, The Christian JJay 
Scltool Movement, 1960-1982. 17 Eouc. F. 135 (1983); Devins, State Regulation of Christian 
Schools, 10 J. LEGIS. 351 (1983) [hereinafter cited as State Regulation]; Devins, Fundamentalist 
Schools vs. the Regulators, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1983, at 26, col. 3. 
5. See Lines, Private Education and State Regulation, 12 J. L. & Eouc. 189, 197 n.8 (1983); 
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Although most parents who seek to educate their children at home are 
dedicated and sincere, several states have enacted statutes that severely 
restrict or even eliminate the home instruction alternative. 
The parents' right to teach their children in the home is premised on 
the parent-child bond. The primacy of this parent-child bond is be-
yond dispute.6 In most situations, the state must demonstrate abuse or 
neglect before it can interfere with this relationship.7 Yet some individ-
uals contend that in education, government regulations should promote 
a state-selected system of values.8 Comprehensive state regulatory 
schemes reflect this view for they frequently severely limit parental 
choice among educational altematives.9 
Increasingly parents are going to court to challenge restrictive state 
education procedures on both statutory and constitutional grounds. On 
constitutional grounds, parents claim that these procedures deprive 
them of their fundamental right, protected by the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment, to direct the upbringing of their children. 10 
On statutory grounds, parents argue that their home study program sat-
isfies vague "equivalency with public schools" statutes, 11 or that their 
home should be viewed as a private school for purposes of state com-
pulsory education laws. 12 These parents usually recognize that the 
state has authority to demand that its young attain minimum academic 
competence in a basic curriculum. 13 Some states, however, contend 
that only through the total prohibition of home instruction or the de-
velopment of comprehensive standards to regulate home instruction 
can they meet their compelling responsibility to ensure that every child 
in the state receives an adequate education. 14 
This Article attempts to define the boundaries of permissible state 
authority in the home schooling context. The underlying thesis of this 
Ward, Wltat Happens Wlten Parents Tum Teachers, N.Y. Times Winter Survey of Education, Jan. 
10, 1982, sec. 13 at 3. 
6. See infta notes 67-81, 95-122 & 213-21 and accompanying text. 
7. See generally Wald, State Intervention on Beha(f of "Neglected" Children: A Search for 
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1978). 
8. See infta notes 203 & 204. 
9. See infta notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text. 
10. See infta notes 112-22 and accompanying text. 
11. See infta notes 176 & 177. 
12. See infta notes 157-61 & 170-72 and accompanying text. 
13. See Ball, Religious Liberty: New Issues and Past .Decisions, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDI-
CIAL REFORM, 327-49 (P. McCuligan & R. Rader, eds. 1981). 
14. See infta notes 43 & 44. 
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Article is that the state cannot prohibit or render meaningless the home 
study option. At the same time, the state has authority to insist that 
students taught at home learn as much as their public school counter-
parts. Supreme Court decisions recognize the fundamental nature of 
both a parent's child-rearing interest15 and religious freedom}6 Also, 
writings in the fields of developmental psychologyl7 and educational 
theory, 18 as well as writings concerning the role of education in an open 
political system, recognize the parents' special interest in directing their 
child's education. 
This Article is divided into four sections. The first section is devoted 
to an overview of both the reasons why parents choose to teach their 
children at home and the types of regulations used by the state to gov-
ern home instruction.19 The next section discusses the basis for the 
state's authority to intervene in family education matters and due pro-
cess limitations on such intervention.20 State authority over family 
matters is based on its collectivist interest in an educated populace and 
its parens patriae interest in the wellbeing of its youth. One limitation 
on the state's authority is the parents' fundamental right to direct the 
religious upbringing of their children. This fundamental right is not 
absolute, however, because the state may reasonably regulate educa-
tional alternatives. 
The third section of this Article systematically describes court rulings 
on the home instruction issue.21 This section begins with a discussion 
of two recent lawsuits that challenge total prohibition of home instruc-
tion. These cases may provide significant insight into the scope of legit-
imate state authority over the home study alternative. The remainder 
of this section highlights the limited precedential value of other state 
cases on the issue whether the state can constitutionally prohibit or 
make meaningless the home study option. Failure on the part of states' 
and parents' attorneys either to raise significant issues or to introduce 
evidence to support their claims is a prime cause of the courts' inability 
to speak clearly on this issue. Additionally, many of these cases raise 
15. See infra notes 67-81, 95-122 & 213-21 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 93 & 200. 
17. See authorities cited infra notes 213 & 214. 
18. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 23-54 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 55-129 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 130-99 and accompanying text. 
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narrow statutory issues, which do not lend themselves to constitutional 
extrapolations. 
The final section of this Article is a critical analysis of arguments 
used by the states to justify governmental interference with the fam-
ily.22 This section attempts to explain the limited reach of the state's 
communitarian and parens patriae interests. In the home study context, 
this limited state interest is sufficient to justify regulations governing 
hours of core curriculum, length of school day and school year, student 
reporting, and competency examinations. More expansive regulations 
unconstitutionally interfere with the fundamental parent-child bond. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY 
Parents teach their children at home for a number of reasons. Not 
surprisingly, the most common of these reasons is dissatisfaction with 
the public school system. 23 These dissenting parents share a common 
disenchantment with the academic and social environments of public 
schools.24 For these parents, the state, if left to its own devices, will 
create a monolithic educational structure that will stamp out "the 
needed diversity for a truly free society."25 These parents also are fear-
22. See infra notes 200-29 and accompanying text. 
23. For an expanded discussion of parental dissatisfaction with the public school system, see 
Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at 355-59. 
24. SeeS. ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF 75-134 {1983); Carper, supra note 4, at 281-282, 
25. J. WHITEHEAD, THE NEw TYRANNY 3 (1982). According to Stephen Arons, the public 
school inculcates in its students a set of state-selected values: 
[t]he values in which public school students must confess belief include the following: 
1. Authority in society should be organized hierarchically, and it is appropriate for 
those of less authority to cultivate attributes of obedience and passivity. 
2. Truth is prescribed and established by authority and learning means understand-
ing and accepting the official version of reality. 
3. Material acquisition, rather than spiritual condition, is the most significant meas-
ure of personal success and social progress; and measurement, rather than intuition, de-
fines knowledge. 
4. Competition is more important than cooperation. 
5. The ability to follow directions is more important than creativity, and dissent is 
either the result of poor communication, willful misanthropy, or emotional instability. 
No single family articulates the values underlying public schooling in just this lan-
guage; and all the families offended by beliefs they see enshrined in public schools do not 
agree on which values constitute public orthodoxy. The list of offensive school beliefs 
grows, however, with each conversation one has with ''unschoolers." 
6. Poverty, malnutrition, disease, oppression, and violence are not created by anyone 
who lives according to society's rules, and people in general should perform whatever 
acts are required by their "roles" without ethical discomfort. 
7. Compulsion and coercion are acceptable means of creating proper behavior, in-
cluding learning. 
8. There are specific character attributes associated with race, gender, class, and age 
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ful of the "moral breakdown" in our public schools, which they associ-
ate with lack of discipline, social permissiveness, and drug and alcohol 
abuse.26 
Parents also seek to teach their children at home for religious rea-
sons. Some Christian educators and parents, for example, believe that 
public schools have become too "secularized," with the result that reli-
gious values no longer have a place in public education.27 This lack of 
religion in public education can partially be attributed to Supreme 
Court decisions that prohibited organized prayer,28 Bible reading,29 
and the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools.30 The 
inclusion of sex education and evolution courses in the public school 
curriculum, which some Christian educators find morally objection-
able, exacerbates this problem.31 
In addition to their religion-based criticisms of the public schools, 
Christian educators also seek to advance a particular set of religious 
values through home education. These educators believe that educa-
tion should be inherently religious and thus oppose state efforts to li-
cense their home study programs. 32 In court, Christian educators and 
parents argue that state efforts to limit or prohibit home instruction 
deprive them "of their liberty to freely carry out their religious mission 
in the form of Christian education. . . ."33 Parents who wish to teach 
their children at home may base their actions on two constitutionally 
that cannot be changed and upon which may be based the distribution of power, wealth, 
and dignity. 
9. Institutional schooling oontributes to the progress of the individual and society, 
upgrades general morality, reduoes prejudice, and protects each rising generation from 
the mistakes of the previous generation. 
10. Manual labor can never attain the dignity or power of intellectual labor; and art, 
music and mysticism are nonessential. 
S. ARONS, supra note 24, at 100-01. 
26. See D. Ham, Reasons Why Parents Enroll Their Children in Fundamentalist Christian 
Schools (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri at Columbia, 1982). Along with 
a general "moral breakdown" in the schools, parents also claim they are concerned with the de-
crepitation of schools, asbestos, and other dangers. 
27. See Rice, Coi1Scientious Objection to Public Education: The Grievance and the Remedies, 
1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 847; Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular 
Humanism and Its First Amendment Implication, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. I (1978). 
28. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
29. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
30. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
31. See Rice, supra note 27. 
32. See Devins, Fundamentalist Schools and the Law, Chris. Sci. Mon., Sept. 22, at 23 coL 4. 
33. Bangar Baptist Church v. State, 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (D. Me. 1982) (citing plainturs 
petition). See also Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983); State v. Moorehead, 308 
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protected rights. First, the parents' right to direct the upbringing of 
their child is protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.34 Second, the parents' right to protect the religious up-
bringing of their child is protected by the free exercise clause of the first 
amendment.35 
Parental desires to direct their children's education often conflict 
with state laws and regulations governing home instruction. Because 
education is not a fundamental right protected by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 36 courts afford the state great lee-
way in developing the contours of its educational system. The author-
ity of the state to promulgate reasonable regulations to govern all forms 
of schooling is beyond doubt. In Runyon v. McCrary,31 the Supreme 
Court noted that the constitutional prohibition against government reg-
ulation of child-rearing decisions does not similarly restrict the govern-
ment from regulating parental decisions concerning their child's 
education.38 In addition, the Runyon Court indicated that a constitu-
tional right to send children to private schools does not mean that pri-
vate schools could not be subjected to reasonable government 
regulation.39 In a similar vien, the Court noted in Gillette v. United 
States,40 that "neutral prohibitory or regulatory laws having secular 
aims may impose certain 'incidental burdens' on free exercise when 
'the burden on First Amendment values is . . . justifiable in the terms 
of the Government's valid aims."41 The determination of whether a 
regulation is reasonable ultimately rests with the judiciary. The judici-
ary has afforded states a great deal of discretion in determining what 
sorts of regulations ought to govern education.42 
N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981); State v. Staver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 
359 (W.Va. 1981). 
34. See infta notes 112-29 and accompanying text. 
35. See infta notes 82-99 and accompanying text. 
36. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Goldstein, 
Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis q[Serrano v. Priest and Its Prog-
eny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972). But see Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 1929, 135 
Cal. Rptr. 345, cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Clune, Coons, & Sugarman, Educational Opportu-
nity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Finance Structures, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1969). 
37. 427 u.s. 160 (1976). 
38. Id at 178. See also authorities cited in Note, The State and Sectarian Education: Regula-
tion to .Deregulation, 1980 DuKE L.J. 801, 811-12 n.59. 
39. 427 U.S. at 178. 
40. 401 u.s. 437 (1971). 
41. ld at 462. 
42. For a discussion of regulations governing home study programs, see Lines, Private Educa-
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States that seek to limit the home instruction alternative claim that 
the regulation (or even prohibition) of home instruction is necessary to 
ensure adequate education of their young. The Virginia State Board of 
Education, for example, sought to justify a "state approval of home 
tutor" requirement by suggesting that the home study environment was 
educationally deficient. The Board felt it was reasonable for the Gen-
eral Assembly to conclude that the more structured and controlled en-
vironment of an educational institution was superior to the more 
relaxed and private surrounding of a home education program.43 Simi-
larly, North Carolina prohibits home instruction because the state 
claims that it cannot rely on the parents to provide the necessary moti-
vation to the child to assure that the child has access to a quality educa-
tion. Unlike operators of nonpublic schools, the State believes that it 
cannot rely on the existence of collective market forces in the form of 
parental demands and concerns to assure that children have access to 
an education and that the education provided will be of some minimal 
quality.44 North Carolina's absolutist approach is unusual, however. 
lion Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J. LAW & Eo. 189, 194-97 (1983); Tobak & Zirkel, Home 
Instruction: An Analysis of the Statutes and Case Law, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 51-2 (1982). For a 
comparable discussion of private school regulation, see Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at 
361-63; P. Kinder, The Regulation and Accreditation of Nonpublic Schools in the United States 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri at Columbia, 1982). 
43. [f)he home environment usually is marked by relaxation, privacy, and close rela-
tionships formed by bonded lifetimes. It is reasonable for the General Assembly to 
conclude that education is provided to a greater extent in an environment where disci-
pline and control is more objective, where the program and progress of study are verifia-
ble, where the teacher has a singular role as teacher, where the student has a singular role 
as student and where the exclusive focus and reason for meeting is the educational 
program. 
Virginia Supreme Court Bars Parents' "Private Schoo!,,Educ. Daily, Dec. 9, 1982, at 7. See also 
People v. Turner, 121 Cal App. 2d Supp. 861, 263 P.2d 685 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 
(1954) (parents teaching at home needed teaching certificate while teachers in private schools did 
not need a certificate). For the Turner court: 
The most obvious reason for such difference in treatment is . . . the difficulty in super-
vising without unreasonable expense a host of individuals, widely scattered, who might 
undertake to instruct individual children in their homes as compared with the less diffi-
cult and expensive supervision of teachers in organized private schools. 
/d at 864, 263 P.2d at 688. 
44. Appellant's Brief at 14, Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984). In his book, Compelling Brief, Stephen Arons noted: 
Home-schooling controversies in effect bring out the ideological defense of government 
schooling: 
I. The problem of conflict between families and schools is one of balancing the inter-
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Thirty-four states permit some form of home instruction.45 
Regulation of home education varies considerably among the states 
that allow home instruction. At one extreme, Louisiana allows parents 
to teach their children at home with minimal supervision. Parents need 
only provide the State Board of Education with a proposed home study 
program and have their children take a standardized achievement test 
at the end of each school year.46 At the other extreme, Michigan re-
quires that "teachers for home instruction must be certified and instruc-
tion must be comparable to that provided in public schools."47 
Among those states that permit home instruction, it is often difficult 
to ascertain what parents must do to have a home study program ap-
proved by the state or local education authority. The primary reason 
for this confusion is that twenty-one states allow home instruction by 
permitting "equivalent" or "comparable" instruction outside of 
schools.48 The determination of equivalency, as might be expected, 
varies considerably from state to state and from district to district 
within a state.49 
ests of the two. Parents do have important rights and responsibilities, but society has the 
predominant responsibility for family morals and beliefs .... 
2. One of the obligations of the public that can legitimately be carried out through 
school policy is the protection of children from "bad" parenting. . . . 
3. . . . Home schooling does not respect the right of children to differ from parents 
and impose an even more rigid orthodoxy upon a dissenting child than any school sys-
tem could. 
4. School is an essential force of social cohesion. . . . 
5. The socialization of children in groups is essential. Only through peer-group 
schooling can children learn to get along in a highly independent society. 
6. The mixing of children from different backgrounds and from families with differ-
ing beliefs and values is vital to peace in a pluralistic society. . .. 
7. The adequate function of the American democratic system requires that every 
child be taught the values of liberty as well as the skills of literacy .... 
8. Children who are educated at home . . . may become a social burden in a com-
plex society and may be deprived of economic opportunity. 
S. ARONS, supra note 24, at 121-23. 
45. See Tobak & Zirkel. supra note 42, at 12. 
46. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:236 (West 1982). See also Marcus, As Busing Begins in 
Schools_ Louisiana Clears Way for Teaching in Homes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1981 at 14a, col. I. 
47. A.G. Op. No. 5579, Sept. 27, 1979 (interpreting MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 380.1561 (1979)). 
48. The following states have "equivalency" exceptions: Alabama, California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Vermont. and Wisconsin. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 42, at 6-10. Nine of these states have clear-
cut regulatory provisions, however: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, 
New York, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. /d. 
49. Two decisions by the Rhode Island commissioner of education demonstrate this variance. 
In the case of Linda Rothwell. the state approved the home study program of a "dedicated and 
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Several states have statutory or regulatory guidelines governing 
home instruction. The most stringent of these guidelines specify 
teacher qualifications. Five states allow home instruction only if a 
teacher is certified, which rules out most parents. 5° Four states demand 
that teachers be "competent," paving the way for inconsistent rulings of 
the meaning of "competence."51 Other requirements govern the length 
of the school day and academic year and the nature of classroom 
materials. 52 
State regulation that does not explicitly provide for home instruction 
and only implicitly refers to home instruction by way of open-ended 
"equivalency'' statutes appears to be a thing of the past. The phenome-
nal growth of home schooling-in conjunction with state legislative 
dissatisfaction with recent court rulings-is spurring the development 
of more specific guidelines in several states.53 These regulations un-
doubtedly will give rise to increased litigation. Parents will challenge 
the constitutionality of these provisions on due process and religious 
liberty grounds. In addition, a similar rise in litigation will occur in 
those states where state and local education officials interpret 
"equivalency" statutes in a restrictive manner. Home instruction is be-
coming a great source of conflict between religious sectors and the 
state. 54 
II. PARENTS V. THE STATE 
The conflict between the parent's interest in directing the educational 
and religious upbringing of their children and the state's interest in the 
adequate education of its youth is the subject of an ongoing legal con-
troversy. An understanding of both of these interests is necessary to 
concerned parent." Mrs. Rothwell was a high school graduate. Yet. in the case of Brigitta Van 
Dam, the state refused to approve the Van Dam home study program. Interestingly, the Van 
Dam children performed well on school administered tests. Additionally, Mrs. Van Dam has a 
master's degree in art education. See Ward, supra note 5. 
50. Alabama, California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 
42, at 6-10. 
51. Arizona, Hawaii, New York, South Dakota. See id. 
52. See id. at 12. 
53. Crary, Educators Expect Fight 0Per Minimum Private-School Standards, Denver Post, 
Aug. 11, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (Colorado attempted to establish private-school standards without con-
sidering the Christian educator's perspective). 
54. John Whitehead, an attorney who represents religious causes, predicts that home instruc-
tion will be the most significant contemporary legal issue facing the Christian community. See 
Devins, State Regulation, supra note 4, at 361-62. 
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answer the question whether parents have a constitutional right to in-
struct their children in the home. 
Education is one of the state's most compelling responsibilities. In 
Brown v. Board of Education, 55 for example, the Supreme Court 
commented: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of the state and 
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education demonstrate our recognition of the importance 
of education to our democratic society . . . in these days, it is doubtful 
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is de-
nied the opportunity to an education.56 
Philip Kurland similarly noted the central role of schooling in the 
"American dream." According to Kurland, in America, education be-
came the great equalizer. Individuals could raise their consciousness, 
ethics, culture, or earning power through education. These benefits to 
the individual translated into benefits to society. ''Thus the United 
States became one of the most schooled societies in the history of 
man."s7 
Because education is not a fundamental right, 58 courts are reluctant 
to interfere with state regulations and procedures governing the struc-
ture of education. 59 The Supreme Court consistently has emphasized 
that public education is a matter of state and local concern and that 
federal courts should refrain from intervening in the daily operation of 
schools unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.60 The well-
being of children is clearly within the authority of the state to regulate 
and protect.61 State power over the child may extend even beyond the 
exercise of constitutional rights by the parents. In Prince v. Massachu-
setts,62 for example, the Supreme Court upheld child labor laws over a 
legitimate free exercise claim. In so doing, the Court held that neither 
religion nor parenthood place the family beyond state regulation in the 
55. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
56. Id at 493. See also cases cited in Clune, Coons, & Sugarman, supra note 36, at 376-78. 
57. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion 
Clauses, 15 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 215 (1973). 
58. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
59. Ironically, the state also has great authority to govern the structure of education because 
education is one of the state's most compelling responsibilities. See supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text. 
60. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
61. Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). 
62. 321 u.s. 158 (1943). 
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public interest.63 Acting to guard the general interest in its youths' 
well-being, the state may restrict the parents' control by requiring regu-
lar school attendance or prohibiting child labor.64 
State intervention in the parent-child relationship can be justified 
under one of two standards. One standard governs state intervention 
pursuant to the state's interest as a collective entity. The other standard 
governs state intervention on behalf of the child as a developing indi-
vidual.65 The state's collectivist interest is merely an exercise of the 
state police power designed to promote the public welfare. 66 
The scope of the legitimate governmental interference with the par-
ent-child relationship on collectivist grounds is quite narrow. Judicial 
recognition of the fundamental nature of the parent-child bond man-
dates strict scrutiny of state efforts to interfere with that relationship. 
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 61 for example, the Supreme Court noted 
that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der."68 In Roe v. Wade,69 the Supreme Court elaborated on the Prince 
ruling by suggesting that the fundamental privacy concept has "some 
extension" to family relationships.70 
63. ld at 166. The Prince Court also recognized the primacy of parental authority over their 
children. See in.fra note 68. 
64. 321 U.S. at 166. 
65. See Knudsen, Tlte Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1506, 1511-17 (1974); 
Project. Education and the Law: Stale Interests and Individual Rights, 14 MICH. L. REV. 1373 
( 1976); Note, Stale Intrusion into Family Affairs: Just!ftcations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 
1383 (1974). 
66. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1199 
( 1980) ("A large number of state ends have been considered legitimate objectives of the police 
power, including the promotion not only of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, 
but also more abstract goals like aesthetic and family values."). 
67. 321 u.s. 158 (1943). 
68. ld at 166. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), for example, the Supreme Court 
stated that "to marry, establish a home, and bring up children" is a constitutionally protected form 
of liberty. ld at 399. 
69. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
70. ld at 152-56. Similarly, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1973), the 
Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that prohibited extended family members from 
residing in a single family dwelling because "freedom of personal choice in matters and family life 
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." ld at 
499. The plurality opinion was of the view that "[ojur decisions establish that the Constitution 
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in 
this nation's history and tradition." ld at 503-04. Similarly, in Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 645 
( 1972), the Court invalidated a state statute providing that illegitimate children, upon the death of 
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Strict scrutiny analysis requires the state to demonstrate that its pro-
cedures are the least restrictive means available to effectuate some com-
pelling state interest.71 Few state regulations governing family conduct 
can pass constitutional muster under this standard.72 To justify an in-
their mother, become wards of the state without a hearing on the parental fitness of the father. 
For the Court, "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of 
his or her child come[s] to this court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to 
liberties which derive mainly from shifting economic arrangements." Id at 651. See also Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (state must demonstrate compelling interest to 
interfere even indirectly-with a woman's decision to have a child); United States v. Orito, 413 
U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy includes right of marriage, procreation, moth· 
erhood, child rearing, and education); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom of choice in 
marital decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing, in the family 
context, that "the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras , , . that help give 
them life and substance"). 
In contrast to this group of cases, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the district court 
in Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), qff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907. The 
Boker court, in recognizing the legitimacy of a state's parens patriae power in the corporal punish· 
ment context, held that "parental control over childrearing" should not be considered a funda-
mental constitutional right "in the hierarchy of constitutional values." Id at 299. The Supreme 
Court approved the use of corporal punishment in a subsequent decision, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651 (1977), without directly addressing the "fundamental rights" issue. The Court also ap-
proved an interference in the child-parent bond over a due process objection in Wyman v. James, 
400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman held that the state's parens patriae interest in the child was sufficient 
to justify home visits by welfare caseworkers. ld at 318-24. These decisions have been severely 
criticized for ignoring the primacy of the parent-child bond. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Chit· 
dren and Their Parents: The Impact ofWyman v. James, 69 MlCH. L. REv. 1259 (1971); Rosen-
burg, Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 75 (1978). 
For other commentaries suggesting that the courts should subject state interferences with the fam-
ily to strict scrutiny review, see Keiter, Privacy, Children and their Parents: Reflections on and 
Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1982); .Developments in the Law, 
supra note 66. 
71. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000-60 (1978). 
72. The state has a legitimate police power interest in protecting public morals, however. 
Under a rational basis analysis applied to nonfundamental interests, for example, the Supreme 
Court upheld a Georgia law regulating the sale and distribution of obscene material. Paris Adult 
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The state's asserted interests were "in the quality of life 
and in the 'mainten[ance] [of] a decent society.'" ld at 58-60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 
U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). These interests are not sufficiently compelling to 
justify state interference in the family relationship. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 
(1975), for example, the Court held that "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitu-
tionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." Id at 575 (mental patient's consti-
tutional right to liberty violated by state confinement because he was neither dangerous nor 
incapable of surviving if unconfined). The Supreme Court's decisions in Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int, 431 U.S. 698 (1977), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), also reflect this view. 
Carey held that there was no rational or substantial relationship between a law banning the distri-
bution of contraceptives to minors and the state's asserted interest in discouraging juvenile sexual 
behavior. 431 U.S. at 706. Eisenstadt similarly held that there was no rational relationship be-
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fringement of family affairs in the name of the state's co)lective interest, 
the state would have to demonstrate that its regulation prevents a near-
certain societal harm. For example, regulations requiring children to 
be inoculated against contagious diseases embody one sufficiently 
strong state interest.73 Whether less tangible dangers, such as the in-
ability of an uneducated child effectively to exercise his franchise in a 
participatory democracy, constitute a sufficiently compelling state in-
terest is a more difficult question. The Court's decision to uphold child 
labor laws in Prince suggested that the state might have such authority. 
Yet, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,14 the Supreme Court held that the state's 
interest in compulsory education was not of sufficient magnitude to 
override a parent's interest in having the child exempted from public 
school for religious reasons. 
States also attempt to justify their efforts to interfere in family affairs 
on the ground that the state has a right to protect the personal interests 
of a child-the state's role as parens patriae. The state's parens patriae 
power allows the state to interfere in family matters to protect the 
child's physical, educational, and emotional well-being.75 The state 
may exercise its parens patriae power in the face of parental neglect.76 
No bright line exists between acceptable and unacceptable parental 
behavior. Clearly, the state can demand that a child receive life-saving 
medical treatment.77 The line between parental punishment and child 
abuse or between inattention and abandonment, however, is not so 
clear. Until the Supreme Court's landmark 1967 decision, In re 
tween restricting the sale of contraceptives to minors and the state's interest in detering extramari-
tal sexual conduct. 405 U.S. at 450-53. 
73. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II (1905), the Supreme Court upheld the right of 
the state to compel immunization of its citizens. For a discussion of the relevance of Jacobson to 
the compelled immunization of minors, see Note, supra note 65, at 1390 n.43. 
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Prince, speaking in general terms of "the crippling effects of child 
labor'" 321 U.S. at 168, ignored the peculiar circumstances of the case. See id. at 173 (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). Yoder, on the other hand, focused on these particular circumstances. For this reason, 
Philip Kurland suggested that Yoder made Prince an "unworkable precedent." Kurland, supra 
note 57, at 243. 
75. Note, supra note 65, at 1391-92. 
76. S. KATZ. WHEN PARENTS FAIL 57 (1971). (Neglect statutes "in many respects, incorpo-
rates a community's view of parenthood. Essentially, they are pronouncements of unacceptable 
child practices."). 
77. See, e.g., People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cerl. denied, 344 
U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricne, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cerl. denied, 371 U.S. 890 
(1963); In re Clark, 21 Ohio App. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962). 
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Gault,78 courts were fairly deferential when reviewing an exercise of a 
state's parens patriae power.79 Gault held that the parens patriae doc-
trine was of "dubious relevance" in the juvenile delinquency context 
and thus the state could not invoke it to immunize state delinquency 
statutes from constitutional scrutiny.8° Following Gault, courts began 
to invalidate certain parens patriae exercises on procedural due process, 
void-for-vagueness, substantive due process, or first amendment 
grounds.81 
States justify their compulsory education laws on both collectivist 
and parens patriae grounds. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 82 the Supreme 
Court recognized the legitimacy of both of these state interests. The 
Court approved the state's contention that "some degree of education is 
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently 
in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and indepen-
dence."83 The Court also acknowledged the state's parens patriae 
rights: "Education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-suffi-
cient participants in society."84 Justice White, concurring, recognized a 
broader parens patriae interest, which included "the [state's] right to 
make a 'cultural' guess, the right to be able to predict the attributes of 
our future culture and design an 'educational package' to equip the 
child with the necessary cultural survival skills."85 According to Justice 
White, "[a] state has a legitimate interest . . . in seeking to prepare 
[children] for the lifestyle that they may later choose."86 
Although the Court in Yoder recognized the legitimacy of a state's 
interest in mandating compulsory education, it upheld the claims of 
members of the Old Order Amish Faith who sought to exempt their 
children from high school attendance. First, the Court emphasized the 
78. 397 u.s. 1 (1967). 
79. See .Developments in the Low, supra note 66, at 1221-27. 
80. 397 U.S. at 44-56. 
81. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1977) (substantive due process); Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (first amendment); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 159 (1975) 
(procedural due process); Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37 (Ark. 1979) (void for vagueness). For a 
general discussion of this issue, see .Developments in the Low, supra note 66, at 1227-42. 
82. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
83. Id at 221. 
84. ld 
85. ld at 238-39 (White, J., concurring). See also Stocklin-Enright, The Constitutionality of 
Home Education: The Role of the Parent, the Stale and the Chillt 18 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 562, 
577 (1982). 
86. 406 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring). 
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diluted state interest in educating fourteen and fifteen year old children 
who were socially acculturated and mentally developed. 87 Second, the 
Court accepted the proposition that the early teenage years were crucial 
in determining whether a child would remain a part of the Old Order 
Amish and, therefore, elevated the parents' interest in removing their 
children from school. 88 
The exemption granted the Amish in Yoder should not be construed 
as unlimited license for parents to control the education of their chil-
dren. At the outset, the Court noted: "There is no doubt as to the 
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citi-
zens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of 
basic education. Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the 
function of a state."89 In addition, the Court stressed the self-contained 
nature of the Amish community.90 Apparently, the Court would not 
have exempted the children in Yoder from public school attendance if 
they seemed likely to become members of the mainstream society.91 
Even if the children were to become part of the self-contained Amish 
community, the Court would not have permitted their removal if they 
were too young to have acquired basic academic skills.92 Finally, the 
Court suggested that it would not accord a similar right to parents who 
87. ld at 223-25. In response to this conclusion, Philip Kurland noted: 
Never, I submit, has the concept of the importance of secondary education received such 
a blow from the judiciary. Secondary education may not be regarded by a state as essen-
tial to "the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, order, or wel-
fare" of the state. What is the justification for compulsory secondary education then? 
How could a state ever meet the burden placed on it by the Court here to show that it has 
a valid interest in educating its children beyond the primary grades? 
Kurland, supra note 57, at 229-30. 
88. 406 U.S. at 217-18. 
89. Id at 213. 
90. Id at 215-17. The Amish Order is distinct from other religions in that their daily life and 
religious practice stem from their literal adherence to "the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of 
Paul to the Romans, 'be not conformed to this world.'" /d at 216. 
91. /d at 215-17. The majority paid little attention to evidence produced by the state that "a 
significant number of Amish children do leave the Old Order.'' /d at 245 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). Instead, the majority assumed that the child would choose as an adult to remain in the 
Amish community. ld at 224-25. 
92. /d at 225 (Court recognized need for minimum academic standards to fulfill the "social 
and political responsibilities of citizenship"). Significantly, the Court approvingly cited testimony 
of education expert Donald Erickson "that the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age 
children to be productive members of the Amish community. . . . [T}heir system of learning 
through doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the Amish community [is} 'ideal' 
and perhaps superior to ordinary high school education." ld at 212. 
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wished to remove their child from school for nonreligious reasons.93 
The Court emphasized that "[the compulsory attendance law] carries 
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of 
religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent."94 
Despite the fact-specific nature of the opinion, much in Yoder sug-
gests that parents have broad discretion to direct the upbringing of 
their children. Of foremost importance, the Court concluded that the 
state's communitarian and parens patriae interests were not sufficiently 
compelling to justify interference with family matters. According to 
the Court, "this case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the 
physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, 
order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly in-
ferred."95 The Court's willingness to look at the peculiar circumstances 
of the case suggests that parents, at least in the religious liberty context, 
will be able to make evidentiary showings as to the adequacy of their 
child-rearing to exempt their children from otherwise reasonable state 
education regulations.96 Yoder also contains substantial language con-
cerning the parent's traditional rights in the child-rearing process. Ex-
emplary of this language is the Court's comment that " [t]he history 
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental 
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary 
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
93. The Court noted: 
[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own 
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. 
Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejec-
tion of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, .. . their claims 
would not rest on a religious basis ... [nor] rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. 
Id at 215-16. 
In many respects, this distinction between a parent's right to direct the religious upbringing of 
his child and a parent's right generally to direct his child's upbringing is unpersuasive. Granted, 
the religious liberty interest might form the basis of a stronger constitutional claim for exemption. 
See, e.g., Boothby, Government Entanglement with Religion: What IJegree oJ Proof Is Required?, 7 
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613 (1980); Devins, A Fundamentalist Right to Education?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 21, 
1983. Yet, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in deciding the general upbringing of their 
children. See infra notes 200-229 and accompanying text. Consequently, any state infringement 
on the parent-child relationship should demand of the state a demonstration that the intervention 
will serve its professed goal. 
94. 406 U.S. at 218. 
95. Id at 230. 
96. In this respect, the Court applied a different approach to the parent-state controversy in 
Yoder than in Prince. See supra note 74. 
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lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."97 The Court 
further noted that the parents' right to prepare their children for addi-
tional obligations extended to "the inculcation of moral standards, reli-
gious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."98 Finally, in the case 
of free exercise challenges, the Court held that states should respect 
parental decisions unless it appears that their decisions "will jeopardize 
the health or safety of the child or have a potential for significant social 
burdens."99 
The Yoder Court did not, however, address the question whether an 
Amish child might have an independent right to attend public high 
school over his parents' objections.100 Justice Douglas dissented on this 
issue, noting that: 
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents, that is imper-
iled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond 
the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from entry into the 
new and amazing world of diversity that we have today. 101 
This notion that children subrogate their rights to their parents is 
supported by several other Supreme Court decisions. In Ginsberg v. 
New York, 102 for example, the Court upheld a state restriction on the 
sale of pornographic literature to minors. The regulation did not pre-
vent parents from purchasing such literature for their minor children. 
The Court recognized that constitutional guarantees are premised on 
an individual's capacity for free choice.103 Because children do not 
possess the full capacity for individual free choice and they do not 
know what is best for them, their parents' traditional role as their 
champion is entirely appropriate.104 Similarly, in Parham v. J.R., 105 the 
Court upheld a Georgia statute providing for admission to state mental 
hospitals through parental request. After admission, the hospital staff 
97. 406 U.S. at 232. 
98. Id at 233. 
99. Id at 234. 
100. The majority contended that this "is not an issue in the case .... The State has at no 
pomt tned this case on the theory that respondents were preventing their children from attending 
school against their expressed desires. . . ." ld at 231. 
101. Jd at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For analyses of the Yoder case that stress the chil-
dren's nghts issue, see Knudsen, supra note 25; Note, Adjudicating What Yoder Leji Unresolved· 
R~lig1ous Rights for Minor Ch11dr~n After Danforth and Carey, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1978). 
102. 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
103. ld at 650. 
104. ld 
105. 442 u.s. 584 (1979). 
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would decide whether the child should be released or kept under care. 
The Court held that reliance upon the parental request was proper be-
cause the law presumes that parents possess both maturity and judg-
ment to guide their children, but more importantly, because the parent-
child bond will cause the parents to act in the best interest of their 
child.Io6 
Support for the notion of parental control can also be found in a 
106. Id at 602. John Garvey similarly commented: 
It is the parents who are most familiar with the effects a particular design might have 
on their child. They are also in the best position to understand the motives behind a 
child's wishes and, indeed, to know what the child's umepresented wishes are. A family 
right to autonomy would maximize the communication between family members. More-
over, family members are likely to be more capable than the state of providing the kind 
of continuing understanding and care necessary after any decision has been made that 
affects the long-term welfare of the child. 
Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the .Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent 
Work, 51 S. CALIF. L. REv. 769, 816-17 (1978). The presumption that parents act in the "best 
interests" of their children also is evidenced by the fact that courts require parental consent gener-
ally for all but life-saving medical treatment. See Brown & Truitt, The Rights of Minors to Medi-
cal Treatment, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 289 (1982); Ewald, Medical .Decision Makingfor Children: An 
Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 689 (1982); Sokolosky, The Sick Child and the 
Reluctant Parent-A Framework for Judicial Intervention, 20 J. FAM. L. 69 (1981-82); see also cases 
cited supra note 70. 
Limiting this parental authority are several Supreme Court decisions that recognize the minor's 
right to privacy to make decisions concerning abortion and birth control. Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), for example, invalidated a state statute that granted 
parents an absolute veto over a minor child's right to have an abortion. .Da'!forth is distinguish· 
able from Parham and Ginsberg, however. In Parham, professionals at the state hospital ensured 
that release was granted to sane children. Thus Parham, unlike .Danforth, did not grant parents an 
absolute power over their child's liberty interest. Ginsberg also is distinguishable from .Danforth 
on the ground that the quality of the right involved in Ginsburg is of a fundamentally different 
nature than that in .Danforth. Another case supporting the notion that children can act indepen· 
dently of their parents is Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Carey granted 
minors a right to be free from blanket prohibitions against the distribution of contraceptives. 
Unlike .Da'!forth, a parental veto was not at issue in Carey. Although Carey and .Da'!forth speak in 
favor of a minor's right to act independently of their parents, minors who would be capable of 
exercising this right are teenagers. Teenagers presumably are more mature than younger children. 
Consequently, .Da'!forth and Carey might not limit parental authority over children at an earlier 
age. For a similar argument, see Note, supra note 57. Additionally, in Bellotti v. Baird, 433 U.S. 
622 (1979), the Supreme Court suggested that a state could require minor children to obtain either 
parental consent or court approval for an abortion. The Court observed that such a statutory 
scheme would preserve the child's rights, and at the same time provide a legitimate reinforcement 
of parental authority by the state. For the Court: 
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our 
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of 
the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, 
may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make 
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. 
Id at 638-39. 
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group of Supreme Court cases that upheld constitutional claims made 
by schoolchildren against actions taken by local boards of education. 107 
In this group of cases, the Court did not treat the children as autono-
mous actors and their parents as interfering with their autonomy. 108 
Finally, parental dominion over children apparently exists even when a 
mature child seeks emancipation from his family. 109 
Judicial deference to parental control thus often is grounded in prag-
matic terms. A recent commentary summarized the reasons for this 
deference as follows: (1) parents are more sensitive to their child's 
needs than the state can possibly be; (2) parents will probably act in the 
child's best interest because of the close familial relationship; (3) the 
parental right to control the child's upbringing preserves the diversity 
of American society and serves as a barrier to state indoctrination. 110 
The Yoder Court's exemption of Amish children from compulsory 
attendance laws is the strongest Supreme Court statement on parental 
authority over their children's education. To the extent that the Court 
was addressing parents' religious claims, the Court's delineation of the 
extent of parental authority holds true. Yoder, however, contains too 
much language about the general authority of the state in education to 
be considered a strong precedent in favor of nonreligious claims. 111 
107. See Island Tree Union School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (right to receive informa-
tion); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal educational opportunity-nationality); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (procedural due process); San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 
411 U.S. I (1973) (equal educational opportunity-race); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969) (free speech); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 614 (1943) (freedom of con-
science). But see supra notes 69 & 106 (discussion recognizing limitations both in the parent-child 
bond and in parental authority over children). 
108. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights oj; in and for Children, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 
118, 123 (1975). 
109. See, e.g., In re Polovchak, 97 Ill. 2d 212,432 N.E.2d 873 (1983). Polovchak involved the 
right of a twelve-year old to seek emancipation from his parents when his parents decided to 
return to the Ukraine. Applying the standard that a minor should be separated from his parents if 
he was incorrigible, a frequent runaway, or his acts posed serious hazards to himself or others, the 
lllinois Supreme Court concluded that the parents had a right to retain custody of their child. 
Because the United States had already granted the child asylum, the Polovchakdecision is of little 
practical significance. Yet, Polovchak does indicate the general unwillingness of courts to break 
the parent-child relationship, even at the child's request. 
I 10. Developments in the Law, supra note 66, at 1354; see also supra note 107. In addition to 
these pragmatic concerns, John Garvey noted that there is a legitimate parental interest in "living 
one's life through one's children, [which] might be called the parent's right to exercise his religion 
tltrouglt the child, and to extend through the child ideas, language, and customs which the parent 
believes to be important." Garvey, supra note 106, at 806. 
Ill. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text. For a criticism of Yodels elevation of 
religious liberty claims over due process claims, see Kurland, supra note 57; supra note 93. 
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Nonreligious claims find strong support in a group of decisions from 
the 1920's that recognized the due process rights of parents to direct 
their child's upbringing.U2 The first case, Meyer v. Nebraska, 113 in-
volved a state regulation that prohibited the teaching of any language 
other than English through the eighth grade. Under this regulation, a 
court held a private tutor criminally liable for teaching German to an 
elementary school student. The Supreme Court found the regulation 
unconstitutional because "[a teacher's] right to teach and the right of 
parents to engage him so to instruct their children . . . are within the 
liberty of the [fourteenth] [a]mendment."114 The Meyer Court ac-
knowledged that "[t]he desire of the legislature to foster a homogene-
ous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand 
discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate." 115 Analogizing Ne-
braska's statute to Plato's Sparta, 116 the Court noted that such efforts to 
homogenize the young represent "ideas touching the relationship be-
tween individual and State [that are] wholly different from those [plu-
ralistic notions] upon which our institutions rest. ... " 117 
Expanding on Meyer, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters118 ex-
plicitly recognized the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children. In Pierce, the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute 
that required all children to attend public schools. The Court ruled 
that the State could not outlaw private schooling and that the Oregon 
statute would cause a state-imposed standardization that is contrary to 
the fundamental theory of liberty upon which American government is 
based. "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."119 
112. See cases cited in Knudsen, supra note 65, at 1511 n.24; see also in.fra notes 113-29. The 
following discussion is adapted from Devins, Stale Regulation, supra note 4, at 363-65. 
113. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
114. Id at 400. 
115. Id at 402. 
116. According to the Court, Plato recommended that parents raise their children in common 
so that "no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent." Id at 401-02. 
117. Id at 402. 
118. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
119. Id at 535. The Court, however, recognized that: 
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all 
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils, to require that 
all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral char-
acter and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship 
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In the last of the early twentieth century decisions, Farrington v. 
Tokushiage, 120 the Court held unconstitutional a statute that sought to 
promote the "Americanism" of pupils attending foreign language 
schools in the territory of Hawaii. This legislation gave the territorial 
government the power to prescribe the schools' curriculum, entrance 
qualifications, attendance requirements, textbooks, and teacher qualifi-
cations. In addition, the territorial government received the authority 
to regulate the physical plant of schools, inspect facilities and teaching, 
collect fees, and issue permits.121 The Court held that these regulations 
violated the parents' due process rights and their right to control their 
children's education. 122 
The right of parental control has only questionable significance to 
future challenges to state regulation. First, the Pierce, Meyer, and Far-
rington cases involved unusual regulations. The regulation in Meyer 
was not related to a legitimate state interest. The statutes in Pierce and 
Farrington completely eliminated the private school option. Most con-
temporary state regulations are related to a legitimate state interest and 
are not as obtrusive on the private school option as the regulations in 
Pierce and Farrington. 123 Second, the judiciary in the early twentieth 
century was extremely protective of individual rights that seemed 
threatened by any form of governmental action. 124 Presently, the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognizes the constitutionality of reasonable 
state regulations of private schools that promote a compelling state in-
terest in education. In Board of Education v. Allen, 125 for example, the 
Court observed that "[s]ince Pierce, a substantial body of case law has 
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public 
welfare. 
ld at 534. 
120. 273 u.s. 284 (1927). 
121. ld at 291-95. See also J. Walther, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools, 39 (1982) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois). 
122. The Court stated: 
They give affirmative direction concerning the intimate and essential details of such 
schools, their control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons reasonable 
choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum, and textbooks. Enforcement of 
the Act probably would destroy most, if not all, of them; and, certainly it would deprive 
parents of fair opportunity to procure for their children instruction which they think 
important and we cannot say is harmful. The Japanese parent has the right to direct the 
education of his own child. 
273 U.S. at 298. 
123. See supra notes 110-22 and accompanying text. 
124. See LAW AND PuBLIC EDUCATION 32 (S. Goldstein & E. Gee, eds. 1980). 
125. 392 u.s. 236 (1968). 
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confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private 
schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at insti-
tutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers 
of specified training and cover prescribed subjects of instruction." 126 In 
other words, because the state cannot abolish parochial schools, it must 
satisfy its secular interests in education via private schools. Therefore, 
the state must have the authority to regulate the secular educational 
function of private schools. 127 Numerous other Supreme Court deci-
sions have recognized the rights of a state to impose reasonable regula-
tions on its private schools. 128 But the Supreme Court has yet to 
determine where it should draw the line between reasonable and un-
reasonable state regulations. 129 
III. COURT DECISIONS 
The state courts also have not satisfr..ctorily resolved the issue 
whether a state can constitutionally prohibit home instruction. Several 
courts have intimated that no such constitutional right exists.130 Other 
courts have recognized the possibility that such a right is grounded in 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment131 or the free exer-
126. Id at 245-46. 
127. Id at 247. 
128. See authorities cited in Note, supra note 38, at 811-12 n.59. 
129. See Devins, supra note 93. 
130. See Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 109, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (''The plaintiffs' 
claimed right to educate their children through a program of home study free from [state) require-
ment[s) . . . does not rise above a personal or philosophical choice, and therefore is not within the 
bounds of constitutional protection."); Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 455, 461 
(N.D. ill. 1974) (same); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 40, 146 A. 170, 171 (1929) (''The state being 
entitled to supervise education, it is not an answer to a charge of failure to furnish supervised 
instruction to show that equivalent unsupervised instruction is given."); Shoreline School Dist. 
No. 412 v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999, 1003 (1960), cerl. denied, 363 U.S. 814 
(1960) (''We find no merit in the contention of the [parents) that they are excused from the penal-
ties of the compulsory school attendance law because school attendance is repugnant to their 
religion."). 
131. See Perchemlides v. Frizele, No. 16641, at 9 (Mass. App. Ct., Nov. 13, 1978) ("Nonreli-
gious as well as religious parents have the right to choose from the full range of educational 
alternatives for their children."); Pierce v. New Hampshire State Bd. ofEduc., 122 N.H. 762, 768, 
451 A.2d 363, 367-68 (1982) (Douglas and Brock, J.J., concurring) ("approval requirements for 
nonpublic school education may not unnecessarily interfere with traditional parental rights"); 
People v. Turner, 277 A.D. 317, 319-20, 98 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) ("provided 
the instruction given is adequate and the sole purpose . . . is not to evade the statute, instruction 
given to a child at home by its parent, who is competent to teach, should satisfy the requirements 
of the compulsory education law''). 
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cise clause of the first amendment. 132 Yet, all of these cases have in-
volved state procedures that did not foreclose the home study 
alternative. In North Carolina, however, recent state and federal chal-
lenges to that state's absolute prohibition of home instruction address 
this central issue. 133 
The first North Carolina suit, Duro v. District Attorne~ Second Judi-
cial District, 134 raises the general issue whether the state can prohibit 
home instruction over the religious liberty objections of parents. In 
August, 1982, federal district Judge F.T. Dupree, Jr., held the state pro-
hibition unconstitutional as applied to the Duro parents.135 The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned this decision in July, 
1983.136 The Supreme Court declined review. 137 The second lawsuit, 
Delconte v. State, 138 raises the narrow issue whether a home can be 
viewed as a private school for compulsory education purposes by satis-
fying state requirements for nonpublic schools. In January, 1983, a 
North Carolina trial court answered the question in the affirmative.139 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned the trial court.140 The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has agreed to review the case. 
The balancing of parental and state interests in North Carolina is 
especially complicated because of a 1979 state enactment which effec-
tively deregulated nonpublic schools. 141 Under this statute, a nonpub-
132. See State v. Nobel, Nos. S 791-0114-A, S-791-0115-A at 8 (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegheny 
County, Jan. 9, 1980) ("No evidence has been introduced in this case that would demonstrate that 
the state has a compelling interest in applying teacher certification laws to the Nobels [parents] or 
that the educational interest of the State could not be achieved by a requirement less restrictive on 
the religious beliefs of the Nobels."). 
133. Duro v. District Attorney, No. 81-13-Cov.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982), rev'd, 712 F.2d 96 
(4th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984); Delconte v. State, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 
898 (1983). 
134. No. 81-13-Civ.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982), rev'd, 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 998 (1984). 
135. No. 81-13-Civ.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982). 
136. 712 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983), cerl. denied, 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984). 
137. 104 S. Ct. 998 (1984). It has long been recognized that denial of certiorari by the 
Supreme Court neither speaks to the merits nor constitutes a precedent regarding the grant or 
denial of certiorari. See, e.g., United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). Yet, there is 
reason to think that denial of certiorari "shows a lack of strong belief that the decision below was 
wrong and that it was important enough to be reversed by the Supreme Court." Linzer, The 
Relevancy of Certiorari lJenials, 19 CoLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1303 (1979). 
138. No. 82-CVS--0176 (Harnett County Jan. 7, 1983); No. 8311-SC-371 (lith Dist.). 
139. Jd 
140. Delconte v. North Carolina, 65 N.C. App. 262, 308 S.E.2d 898 (1984). 
141. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-378 (1980). The state legislature passed this statute in response 
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lie school would satisfy state standards merely by maintaining 
attendance and disease immunization records and by periodically ad-
ministering a nationally recognized student competency examina-
tion. 142 The court's understanding of this statutory provision has been 
determinative in North Carolina lawsuits. In Duro, the federal district 
court concluded that the state's interest in education "is little more than 
an empty concem."143 Relying, in part, on the Supreme Court's Wis-
consin v. Yoder decision, 144 the district court held that because the 
North Carolina legislature "has abdicated its interest in the quality of 
education received by students in nonpublic schools in favor of 'the 
rights of conscience,' " 145 the state interest was outweighed by the par-
ents' religious liberty interest. In concluding that the state did not as-
sert a compelling enough interest to justify prohibiting home 
instruction, the district court characterized the justification for the state 
prohibition as hollow. North Carolina did not allow for home instruc-
tion because it had no mechanisms to ass!lre that children in the home 
were receiving adequate education. The district court did point out, 
however, that the state did not have a mechanism to assure that chil-
dren in private schools were receiving an adequate education. 146 
The district court decision, in many respects, was fact-specific. The 
court did not decide whether nonreligious parents could prevail on a 
similar claim. The court also emphasized that the state "could develop 
a mechanism permitting home instruction under supervision. . . ." 147 
Finally, the court did not address the issue whether a state with com-
prehensive nonpublic school regulations could prohibit home study. 
The Fourth Circuit reversal of the district court decision spoke in 
more general terms. First, the appellate court "disagree[ d) with the dis-
trict court that the state had abdicated its interest in the quality of edu-
cation received by students in nonpublic schools."148 Deregulation, for 
the appellate court, did not limit the state's compelling interest in com-
to a state court decision which upheld-over religious liberty objections-comprehensive regula-
tions of private schools, including teacher certification. State v. Columbus Christian Academy 
No. 78 (Wake County, N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1978), vacated as moot and dismissed, (N.C. May 4, 
1979). 
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (1980). 
143. No. 81-13-Civ.-2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982) at 7. 
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 82-109 and accompanying text. 
145. Id at 6. 
146. Id at 6. 
147. Id at 7. 
148. 712 F.2d at 98. 
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pulsory education. Apparently, the appellate court would view any 
state regulation as preserving that compelling state interest. Second, 
the Fourth Circuit held that Wisconsin v. Yoder did not provide a 
source for the parents' constitutional interest in home instruction. The 
appellate court viewed Yoder as a very narrow ruling-stressing the 
"self contained" nature of the Amish community and the limited ex-
emption from secondary schooling sought by the Amish. 149 The appel-
late court, unlike the district court, did not view Yoder as balancing the 
state's interest in compulsory education against the parents' religious 
liberty interest. 150 Instead, the Fourth Circuit viewed Yoder as a fact-
specific holding inapplicable to other types of religious exemption 
claims. Consequently, the appellate court rejected the parent's claim 
because "Duro [the parent] has not demonstrated that home instruction 
will prepare his children to be self-sufficient participants in our modem 
society or enable them to participate intelligently in our political sys-
tem .... " 151 This ruling, by placing the burden of proof on the par-
ents, represents a dramatic shift from Yoder, which sought to balance 
the competing interests of the parent and the state. Under the Fourth 
Circuit ruling, the state apparently has an absolute right to prohibit 
home instruction. 
The Delconte lawsuit involves the fairly technical questions of 
whether and when a home is the legal equivalent of a school. Unlike 
the parents in Duro, the parents in Delconte sought to have the state 
approve their home as a school. 152 The trial court in .Delconte agreed 
with the parents because their "home school" satisfied state regulations 
governing nonpublic schools. 153 
149. ld 
150. Id (''The facts in the present case are readily distinguishable from the situation in Yoder. 
The Amish were a 'rural self-sufficient community.' Additionally, the appellate court never ad-
dressed the issue whether parents might have a due process right to teach their children at 
home."). See supra notes 112-29. Clearly, since Yoder recognized that religion-based claims were 
more compelling than secular claims, the parents would have lost on this issue. See supra note 93. 
Significantly, Mr. Duro's attorney never raised this issue in his brief before the appellate court. 
151. 712 F.2d at 99. Significantly, in their statement of the facts, the appellate court noted that 
"despite Duro's concern that his children be sheltered from corrupting influences, he admits that 
when they reach eighteen years of age, he expects them to 'go out and work . . . in the world.' " 
/d at 97. 
152. The state refused to approve the Delconte "school" because the Attorney General opined 
that home instruction does not qualify as an approved nonpublic school. No. 82-CVS-01766 
(Harnett County, Jan. 7, 1983). 
153. Id at 10. In accordance with the district court ruling in Duro, the Delconte court noted 
that even "[i)f the 'Hallelujah School' were not entitled to recognition as a 'qualified school,' the 
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The state court of appeals disagreed and noted that the state legisla-
ture had failed to respond to formal state attorney general opinions that 
a home school does not function as a qualified nonpublic school. The 
court held "that 'school' means an educational institution and does not 
include home instruction."154 
The appellate court also overturned the trial court ruling on the reli-
gious liberty issue. The appellate court viewed a total prohibition of 
home instruction as permissible because "[t]he state [would otherwise 
have] no means by which to insure that children who are at home are 
receiving an education."155 In light of the United States Supreme 
Court's denial of certiorari in JJuro, it is unlikely that the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court would upset the Fourth Circuit's ruling on the reli-
gious liberty issue in JJuro. Consequently, if parents are to prevail in 
Delconte, it seems likely that they will prevail on statutory grounds. If 
the North Carolina Supreme Court reverses on statutory grounds it will 
grant to parents that which JJuro might have denied them on constitu-
'tional grounds. 156 At the same time, such a decision would not serve as 
a precedent in favor of a parent's constitutional right to teach his child 
at home. 
Other state courts have struggled with the constitutional status of 
home instruction, but none have approved a total prohibition as North 
Carolina has. One explanation for the failure of courts to determine 
whether parents have a constitutionally based right to teach their chil-
dren at home is that courts are able to characterize a home as a school 
for compulsory school attendance law purposes. 157 In People v. 
enforcement of North Carolina's compulsory attendance law upon the plaintiff [parent) would 
violate the plaintiff's rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. .•. " /d. 
154. IJe/conte, 65 N.C. App. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 903. 
155. Id. at -, 308 S.E.2d at 904. 
156. The only difference would be that parents, under IJelconte, must register their home 
schools with the state. 
157. Many courts in this situation are unwilling to characterize a home as a school, however. 
See State v. Lowry, 191 Kan. 701,703,383 P.2d 962,964 (1963) ("To determine whether or not the 
defendants [parents) were operating a private school, this court will look to the purpose, intent and 
character of the endeavor."); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 39, 146 A. 170, 170-171 (1929) ("[the 
courts require an institutional setting since) [t)he association with those of all classes of society, at 
an early age and upon a common level, is not unreasonably urged as preparation for discharging 
the duties of a citizen"); Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1950) (same position as the Hoyt court); Shoreline School Dist. No. 42 v. Superior Court, 55 
Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1960), cerl. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960) (same position as the Counorl 
court); State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 363, 124 P. 910, 911 (1912) ("requirement (that children 
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Levisen, 158 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the 
state's public-or-private-school-only compulsory attendance law to per-
mit home study. The court characterized the Levisen home as a private 
school because "[t]he object [of compulsory attendance] is that all chil-
dren shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular 
manner or place."159 Consequently, the court found controlling evi-
dence that indicated that the Levisens' child was receiving equivalent 
or superior instruction at home for five hours a day in all the required 
courses, and that her academic performance was comparable to her 
public school peers. 160 Because of the court's disposition of the case, it 
con~luded that it was ''unnecessary to consider the further contention 
that the statute violates the constitutional right of parents to direct the 
education of their child."161 
Another reason why courts have not resolved the constitutional issue 
is that it has never been squarely presented to the courts. In State v. 
Lowry, 162 for example, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a public-or-
private-school-only statute on statutory grounds because the only ques-
tion presented to the court was whether a home instruction program 
constituted a private school. 163 Similarly, several home study lawsuits 
have addressed secondary issues involving the permissibility of expan-
sive state regulation. 164 These courts have not had to reach the thresh-
old constitutional issue because some type of home instruction 
alternative was available in the state. Finally, attorneys representing 
attend a local public school or approved private school] means more than home instruction; it 
means the same character of school as the public school . . ."). 
158. 404 lli. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950). For similar rulings, see Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of 
Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. lli. 1974); State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550 (Ind. 1904). 
159. 404 Ill. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215. The court, however, went on to note that its decision did 
"not imply that parents may, under a pretext of instruction by a private tutor or by the parents 
themselves evade their responsibilities to educate their children." Id at 571, 90 N.E.2d at 215. 
160. Id at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 214-15. 
161. /d at 578, 90 N.E.2d at 216. 
162. 191 Kan. 701, 383 P.2d 962 (1963). Similarly, in T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) the parents failed to raise pertinent constitutional issues. 
163. In In reSawyer, 234 Kan. 436,672 P.2d 1093 (1984), however, the Kansas Supreme Court 
upheld the Kansas statute on constitutional as well as statutory grounds. Noting that education is 
not a fundamental right, the Sawyer court held that, "(t]he standard of review to be applied then, 
is whether the state's system has some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." /d at 
-, 672 P.2d at 1098. 
164. See, e.g., Hanson v. Cushman, 490 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (teacher certification); 
Scoma v. Chicago Bd. ofEduc., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. lli. 1974) (discretionary approval author-
ity vested in school district); T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) 
(qualified tutor); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980) (teacher certification). 
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both the state165 and parents166 have failed either to raise the "parental 
rights" issue167 or to gamer sufficient evidence supporting such a 
claim.I6s 
Although the authority of a state to prohibit home instruction is an 
open question, the states permitting home study clearly have authority 
to regulate the home educational option. In a study of home education 
lawsuits, James Tobak. and Perry Zirkel concluded: "[w]here the stat-
ute has an explicit exception and specific requirements for home study, 
courts have adamantly rejected the arguments of parents that home 
study qualifies as a private school. Similarly, courts have insisted upon 
compliance with the procedural prerequisites specified in the stat-
ute."169 An example of these parents' failure to demonstrate that home 
instruction constitutes a private school is found in the Florida appellate 
court decision of T.A.F. v . .Duval County. 110 In JJuval, the appellate 
court demanded that parents satisfy a state provision requiring that 
home study be "at home with a private tutor who meets all require-
ments prescribed by law and regulation of the state Board of Educa-
tion."171 Parents in .Duval sought to have their Christian home study 
165. See supra note 132 (discussing State v. Nobel). 
166. See State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60,64 (Iowa 1981) (''These objections to [equivalent 
instruction provisions] were not raised in defendant's [parents] motion to dismiss. Nor does the 
record show that they were raised at any other time prior to this appeal."); State v. Shaver, 294 
N.W.2d 883, 893 (N.D. 1980) ("No attempt was made at the trial to show how compliance with 
the law would affect the religion of the parents or the children."); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 
407,413, 275 N.W.2d 101, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) ("The Kasuboskis did not present evidence on 
an affirmative defense of attendance at an adequate private school."). 
167. Of great significance, the Christian Law Association, one of the most active litigators of 
parents' religious rights in home instruction lawsuits, refuses to raise the defense of excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. These lawyers are strict separationists and thus claim that to 
raise the defense of excessive government entanglement with religion is to concede that some 
government intervention is permissible. See Minncry, Does David Gibbs Practice Law as Well as 
He Preaches Church-State Separation, Christianity Today, Apr. 10, 1981, at 48. This separationist 
tactic has been criticized both for its failure to recognize that some government regulations are 
appropriate and for its weakness as a legal argument. See W. Ball, Memorandum to Our 
Fundamendalist Christian Friends and Other Friends of Religious Liberty, Apr. 14, 1984 (copy on 
file with author). For a discussion of cases where relevant constitutional issues were not raised, 
see supra note 163. 
168. See cases cited supra notes 165 & 166; see also State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 364 (W. 
Va. 1981) ("[l]t is not appropriate for a person to entirely disregard the statute, await criminal 
prosecution, and then assert a first amendment defense."). 
169. Tobak & Zirkel, supra note 42, at 58. 
170. 273 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
171. Id at 17. Many states with specific regulations governing home instruction are more 
comprehensive in their regulation of home study programs than in their regulation of non public 
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program classified as a private school and thereby avoid the private 
tutor requirement. The Duval court required the parents to comply 
strictly with the home instruction statutory procedures and did not dis-
cuss whether the "private tutor" requirement unjustifiably burdened 
religious liberty interests. 172 
More complex than the "home as private school" issue is the ques-
tion whether parents must comply with specific requirements for home 
instruction. No case has adequately addressed this issue. Instead, 
courts have narrowed their focus to the state's need for compliance 
with state procedures governing the process of state approval of home 
instruction. Typical of these decisions is an Ohio appellate court case, 
Akron v. Lane. 113 Lane involved a parent's removal of his hearing-
impaired daughter from the public school system because he was dis-
satisfied with her progress in special education classes. Although the 
parent provided for his daughter's instruction by engaging an allegedly 
certified teacher of the deaf, he did not obtain a statutorily required 
approval of his home study program. Consequently, he was charged 
with violating Ohio's compulsory education law. The court found the 
parent guilty, despite his claim that he was providing his daughter with 
equivalent education. Affirming his conviction, the appellate court 
held that the equivalency issue was "immaterial to the instant prosecu-
tion" because the parent did not comply with state procedures gov-
erning the approval of a home study program. 174 Lane was limited to a 
question of statutory interpretation. Yet, even when the constitutional 
right of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children is at 
schools. Consequently, parents in these states often try to have their home characterized as a 
private school. T.A.F. v. Duval County presented such a situation. Another Florida case that 
reached this conclusion is State v. N.M .• 407 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Rejecting the 
parent's argument, the court stated: "That there is no statutory authority regulating the establish-
ment of private schools in Florida does not mean that Florida parents, unqualified to be private 
tutors, can proclaim their homes to be private schools and withdraw their offspring from public 
schools." /d. at 990. For similar rulings, see People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 
(1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954); Grigg v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 356, 297 S.E.2d 
799 (1982). For a discussion of why states might want to regulate home instruction more exten-
sively than private schools, see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
172. See also Gunnison Watershed School Dist. v. Funk, No. 81-JV-2 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Gunni-
son County. Apr. 17, 1981) (parents similarly failed to raise the religious liberty issue in their 
efforts to have their home study program recognized by the state as a private school). 
173. 65 Ohio App. 2d 90, 416 N.E.2d 642 (1979). 
174. /d. at 95, 461 N.E.2d at 644. For a similar holding, see Gunnison Watershed School Dist. 
v. Cox, No. 81-JV-2 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Gunnison County, Apr. 17, 1981); see also Tobak & Zirkel, 
ntpra note 42, at 54-55 (discussing those and similar cases). 
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issue, courts have similarly held that the parents must comply with 
state procedures prior to adjudication of the constitutional issue. 175 
Substantial doubt also exists over the extent to which a state has the 
authority to require that home instruction must be equivalent to the 
instruction provided in schools. To a large extent, the resolution of this 
issue depends on where the courts place the burden of proof. Must the 
parent establish equivalency or must the state establish non-
equivalency?176 In constitutional challenges to "equivalency" stan-
dards, evidentiary or other problems have prevented the courts from 
squarely addressing the parental rights and religious liberty issues. 177 
Vague statutes, incomplete evidentiary records, and very narrow rul-
ings on the home instruction issue typify this body of case law. Conse-
quently, the scope of permissible state authority and the rights of 
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children remain 
undefined. 
In 1978, a Massachusetts trial court endorsed parental authority in a 
secular context in Perchem!ides v. Frizzle. 178 Perchem!ides held that 
parents are constitutionally entitled to "the right to choose from the full 
range of educational alternatives for their children."179 The Perchem-
!ides court was primarily concerned with preserving parental choice. 
The Massachusetts court believed that it had to create "special stan-
dards" to maintain home instruction as a viable alternative.180 The 
court thus held that approval of a home instruction program should not 
include such factors as the parents' motives, the lack of an identical 
curriculum to that provided in the public schools, socialization, and the 
creation of a precedent for future home instruction proposals if the 
175. See State v. Moorhead. 308 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 1981); Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 244, 
49 S.E.2d 342 (1948); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359 (W.Va. 1981); State v. Kasuboski, 83 Wis. 2d 
909, 275 N.W.2d 101 (1978). 
176. Compare Jernigan v. State, 412 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) ("as we have 
indicated. the defendants have not demonstrated that they can and will continue to provide an 
equivalent education, and it is not incumbent upon the state to verify the same.") with State v. 
Nobel, S-7-91-0114-A (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegheny County, Jan. 9, 1980) (discussed stJpra note 
132). For comprehensive discussion of the significance of burden of proof, see Tobak & Zirkel, 
st1pra note 42, at 41-46; Lines, stJpra note 42, at 212-14. 
177. See stJpra notes 165-68 and accompanying text. 
178. Civil Act No. 16641 (Mass. Super. Ct., Nov. 13, 1978). For an excellent discussion of this 
case, seeS. ARONS, stJpra note 24, at 75-134. 
179. Slip op. at 9. 
180. /d. at 11. 
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plan was approved.181 The most significant aspect of Perchemlides is 
the courCs ruling on the "socialization" issue: 
The question here is, of course, not whether the socialization provided in 
the school is beneficial to a child, but rather, who should make that deci-
sion for any particular child. Under our system, the parent must be al-
lowed to decide whether public school education, including its 
socialization aspects, is desirable or undesirable for their children. 182 
Although considered a significant victory for parents' rights, Perchem-
lides does not significantly constrict the discretion afforded public 
school officials. 
In stark contrast to Perchemlides, some state courts have held "social-
ization" to be an essential component of compulsory education. In its 
1929 State v. Hoyt183 decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court up-
held a public-or-private-school-only statute by finding that it was not 
unreasonable for the state to require education to include a "socializa-
tion" component.184 Similarly, two New Jersey courts have interpreted 
the statutory language "equivalent instruction elsewhere than at public 
school" to include "socialization."185 In one of these cases, the court 
was so bold as to state: 
Education must impart to the child the way to live. This brings me to the 
belief that . . . it is almost impossible for a child to be adequately taught 
in his home. I cannot conceive how a child can receive in the home in-
struction and experiences in group activity and in social outlook in any 
manner or form comparable to that provided in the public school. 186 
A subsequent New Jersey decision nullified this opinion, labeling the 
socialization rationale "untenable ... 187 
Home study decisions also demonstrate conflicting judicial views 
concerning the religious liberty interests of parents in the upbringing of 
181. See Stocklin-Enright, supra note 85, at 598-99 (discussing Perchemlides). 
182. Slip op. at 13. 
183. 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929). 
184. Id at 39, 146 A. at 170-71. Hoyt was severely restricted in New Hampshire in In re 
Pierce, 122 N.H. 762, 451 A.2d 363 (N.H. 1982). See supra note 86 (discussing Pierce). 
185. Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Essex County Ct., 1937); Knox v. 
O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (NJ. Div. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950). 
186. Stephens v. Bongart, 15 NJ. Misc. 80, 92, 189 A. 131, 137 (Essex County Ct., 1937). 
187. State v. Massa, 95 NJ. Super. 382, 386, 231 A.2d 252,255 (N.J. Div. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1967). But see In re Sawyer, 234 Kan. 436, -, 672 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983) (citing favorable testi-
mony that, regardless of the parent's competence as a teacher "a school with more children would 
be generally better for any child since it would provide more social interaction outside of the 
home"). 
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their children. In State v. LaBarge, 188 for example, the Vermont 
Supreme Court noted that compulsory school attendance must-in 
some instances-yield to first amendment concerns and thus a state 
would find it difficult to relegate children only to "approved" educa-
tional institutions.189 Similarly, in State v. Nobel, 190 a Michigan trial 
court held that the state could not require parents to be certified if they 
teach their children at home for religious reasons unless the state in-
troduces evidence that it "has a compelling interest in applying teacher 
certification laws to the [parents] or that the educational interest of the 
state could not be achieved by a requirement less restrictive on the reli-
gious beliefs of the [parents]."191 The Nobel court ruled in favor of the 
parents, concluding that the state was only trying to apply teaching cer-
tification requirements uniformly and was not necessarily concerned 
with the quality of the teaching.192 
Several state court decisions have rejected the religious liberty rights 
of parents, however. In State v. Riddle, 193 for example, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court rejected a religious liberty challenge to a state law 
that required the local school superintendent to approve home study 
programs. The court supported its holding as follows: "There are nu-
merous urgent public policy reasons for having all children between 
the ages of 7 and 16 somewhere within the supervision of the county 
boards of education."194 This position evidences a skepticism to the 
capability of parents to care for their children adequately.195 Display-
ing a similar skepticism, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, in 
Jernigan v. State, 196 validated a state law requiring certified private 
tutors to conduct home study programs. The court held that the law 
did not improperly interfere with the parents' religious liberty rights 
because the burden of proof is on the parents to demonstrate that they 
188. 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). 
189. Id at 280, 357 A.2d at 124. LaBarge, however, was decided on statutory grounds. 
190. No. S791-0114-A (Mich. Dist. Ct., Allegheny County, Jan. 9, 1980). 
191. Id at 8. 
192. Id at 10. 
193. 285 S.E.2d 359 (W. Va. 1981). 
194. Id at 364. 
195. For example, the Riddle court also noted: "Our [public] schools not only teach, but they 
are also responsible for ministering to the health needs of children by providing a reservoir of 
professional expertise capable of ferreting out health-related problems at an early stage." Id In 
light of the constitutionally protected right to attend nonpublic school, this justification seems 
preposterous. 
196. 412 So. 2d 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). 
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can and will provide an equivalent education. 197 This rationale is to-
tally at odds with that of State v. Nobel 198 Other state courts have 
avoided decisions on religious liberty rights by characterizing parental 
claims as philosophical rather than religious. 199 
IV. THE SCOPE OF LEGITIMATE STATE AUTHORITY 
Resolution of the threshold constitutional issue of whether parents 
have a right to educate their children at home arguably is contingent on 
a determination of the nature of the state's interest in education.200 
197. ld at 1247. See supra note 107 (discussing State v. Nobel). 
198. The North Dakota Supreme Court decision, State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 
1980), is quite similar to Jernigan, however. In upholding a teacher certification requirement over 
a religious liberty objection, the Sltaver court contended that the judiciary should defer to state 
education policy decisions because "courts are ill-equipped to act as school boards and determine 
the need for discrete aspects of a compulsory school education program." ld at 889-900. This 
position is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of the need for judicial scrutiny if 
the state's actions "directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
199. See. e.g., State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60, 64 (Iowa 1981) (religion was not an issue 
because parents "did not present any evidence of their religious beliefs or of the manner in which 
chapter 299 interferes with the exercise of those beliefs"); State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407,414, 
275 N.W.2d 101, 105-06 (1978) ("[because] [i]t is only the auxiliary church operated by the 
Kasubosk..is in their home that has ... a tenet [mandating home study, it can be concluded] ... 
that the Kasuboskis removed their children from the public school on the basis of ideological or 
philosophical beliefs. . . ."). 
200. Government regulation that significantly burdens the free exercise of religion cannot 
withstand constitutional challenge unless it represents "the least restrictive means of achieving 
some compelling state interest." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
7ffl, 718 ( 198 I). But the exemption of any religious activity from regulation is not constitutionally 
required where it would "unduly interfere with the fulfillment of the (compelling] government 
interest." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982). 
Constitutional standards under the due process clause are uncertain. Yoder suggests that the 
state need not satisfy the "compelling interest-least restrictive means" test. See supra note 93. In 
addition. some state courts have concluded that when parents do not establish state infringement 
on sincere religious beliefs, which is necessary to trigger free exercise clause review, then the state 
regulation need only bear a rational relation to some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., 
State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407,414,275 N.W.2d 101, 106 (1978). Other courts, however, have 
demanded that the state establish that its regulatory system further some "sufficiently substantial" 
state interest. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing Perchemlides v. Frizzle); 
Ne also In re Pierce, at 768, 451 A.2d at 367 (Douglas and Brock, J.J., concurring). ("[W]hile the 
State may adopt a policy requiring that children be educated, it does not have the unlimited power 
to require that they be educated in a certain way at a certain place."). In the context of a Christian 
school lawsuit, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 201-18, 351 
N.E.2d 750, 768-71 (1976), invalidated a comprehensive state regulatory scheme partially on the 
ground that it improperly interfered with parents' liberty interest in directing the upbringing of 
their children. Judicial recognition of the fundamental nature of parental rights in the upbringing 
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The Yoder majority recognized both the state's communitarian interest 
in effective citizen participation in the political system and the state's 
parens patriae interest in ensuring that the state's youth develop the 
skills necessary for economic self sufficiency.2°1 Both of these recog-
nized state interests are inexact terms subject to normative judicial 
analysis. Varying judicial determinations on the constitutionality of 
state regulations governing Christian schools indicate the subjective na-
ture of the analysis. 202 
Some educators view the state's communitarian interest in an edu-
cated populace as an interest in a populace that shares similar political 
and social views. These educators are known as Cultural Transmission 
theorists or Skinnerians.203 For the Skinnerians, education is a means 
for the state to maintain social order by perpetuating its value system. 
Formal education then consists of transmitting the knowledge, the 
skills, and the social and moral rules of the culture. In addition, Cul-
tural Transmission theorists view education as the oil which lubricates 
of children supports the "sufficiently substantial" standard, not the rational relationship test. See 
supra notes 64-81, 93 & 113w29; infra notes 202·22 and a(;(A)mpanying text. 
201. Justice White, concurring in Yoder, argued that the state had a broader interest in anticiw 
pating the future needs of its young. See supra notes 85 & 86. 
202. The current state of judicial decision-making in Christian school lawsuits is apparent in 
the varying judicial perceptions of teacher certification requirements. In Kentucky State Bd. v. 
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), the Kentucky Supreme Court, in holding a teacher certifica-
tion requirement unconstitutional, contended that 
[i]t cannot be said as an absolute that a teacher in a non public school . . • will be unable 
to instruct children to become intelligent citizens. . . • [T]he receipt of a 'bachelor's 
degree from a standard college or university' is an indicator of the level of achievement, 
but it is not a sine qua non the absence of which establishes that private and parochial 
school teachers are unable to teach their students to intelligently exercise the elective 
franchise. 
Id at 884. The Ohio Supreme Court has similarly held such certification requirements unconsti-
tutional. State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 218, 351 N.E.2d 750, 771 (1976). 
In stark contradiction to these decisions, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a teacher certifi· 
cation requirement in SUtte v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981). 
The Faith Baplisl court argued as follows: 
[I]t cannot be fairly disputed that such a requirement is neither arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. Additionally, we believe it is also a reliable indicator of the probability of success in 
that particular field. We believe that it goes without saying that the State has a compel-
ling interest in the quality and ability of those who teach its young people. 
Id at 816wl7, 301 N.W.2d at 579. 
A Nebraska court used similar reasoning in upholding comparable teacher certification regula-
tions. State v. Columbus Christian Academy, No. 78 (Wake County, Super. Ct., Sept. I, 1978) at 
14, vacating as moo/, (N.C. May 4, 1979). 
203. See Kohlberg & Mayer, .Development as lhe Aim'![ Education, 42 HARV. Eouc. REV. 449, 
452-54 (1972). 
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and, hence, ensures the smooth operation of a predefined (by the state) 
machine (the child).204 
In contrast to the Skinnerian approach,205 the progressive theory of 
education holds that education should nourish the child's natural inter-
action with a developing society or environment. For the Progressives, 
education plays an integral role in the development of a "successful" 
human being. First, education aids the child's personal development as 
an individual qua individual. Second, education serves to help create 
or maintain a healthy state because education encourages the populace 
to take an active role in the positive shaping of its environment. For-
mal education then serves as a way for the child to develop as an indi-
vidual who is a part of greater society. Progressive education theorists 
view education as the acquisition and development of problem-solving 
techniques so that children will be able to face the problems of "to-
morrow" without losing hold of either their personalities or their 
culture. 
Under the Progressive view, the state should encourage its citizens to 
develop and refine their personal interests so that they can participate 
effectively in the political marketplace. In other words, the state should 
not attempt to breed homogeneity through its educational system. 
Progressives emphasize the need to produce graduates capable of in-
dependent and critical assessment of American society.2°6 
Progressive education theorists recognize that the state has a legiti-
mate interest in demanding that all students become literate and pos-
sess a basic understanding of the structure and underlying values of 
government. Cultural Transmission theorists, on the other hand, 
would grant the state much broader authority. These theorists believe 
that the state should seek to inculcate in the child a set of state-selected 
204. See Diamond, The First Amendment and the Public Schools, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 498 
( 1981) ("Sociologists generally accept the necessity of society's transmitting its cultural and moral 
values to the next generation through a process of socialization; in the United States this socializa-
tion process occurs not only in the family, but also in the public education system."). 
205. See Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 203, at 454. 
206. See Finn, Public Support for Private Education II, American Education, June, 1982, at 9 
("Public policy should foster educational pluralism and diversity that are responsive to those dif-
ferences within the society rather than seeking to impose a uniform or homogeneous definition of 
schooling."); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 1104, 1134 (1979) ("The use of public schools to instill political values poses a serious 
threat to the market place of ideas and the integrity of the democratic process."); see also Dewey, 
Education as Politics, 32 New Republic 139 (1922); Katz, The Present Moment in Educational Re-
form. 41 HARV. Eouc. REv. 342 (1971). 
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values. Although some courts have recognized the state's communitar-
ian interest in socialization,207 that view is now generally discredited.208 
In fact, the Supreme Court's explicit recognition of a parent's right to 
real choice in the shaping of his child's education undercuts much of 
the communitarian interest espoused by Cultural Transmission theo-
rists.209 The Progressive's notion of communitarian interest is, how-
ever, consistent with these court decisions.210 The state, under its 
communitarian interest, can legitimately mandate minimum academic 
standards concerning basic academic skills and an understanding of the 
nature of our political system. Yet, this communitarian interest would 
not allow for the prohibition of home instruction. 
The state's parens patriae interest, like its communitarian interest, is 
subject to varying interpretation. Yoder explicitly recognized the state's 
parens patriae interest. "To be sure, the power of the parent, even when 
linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it 
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of 
the child."211 This vaguely defined interest, on the one hand, could 
allow the state to regulate fairly specific details of child rearing. On the 
other hand, interpreted differently, this "formulation of the state's inter-
est might grant parents nearly unlimited authority in the upbringing of 
their children. 
One theory supporting the prohibition of home instruction or the de-
velopment of expansive regulations governing home study under the 
state's parens patriae interest is the "other guy" rationale.212 The "other 
guy" approach holds that without regulations, parents will abuse the 
system and improperly educate their children. Under this theory, regu-
lations are appropriate in instances where a state cannot afford to trust 
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. Proponents of ex-
207. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. 
208. See supra notes 130 & 182. Also supporting this conclusion is the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Board of Educ. Island Trees Union School Free Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
Pico prohibited school boards from removing library books for ideological reasons. By holding 
that the first amendment protects a student's right to receive political information, the Court sug-
gested that social homogenization is not a proper goal of education. See also supra notes 123-29 
and accompanying text (discussing parental rights to send children to private schools over similar 
state homogenization objections). 
209. See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra notes 205 & 206. 
211. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972). 
212. This label is borrowed from an essay by Robert Baker, R. BAKER, STATUTE LAW AND 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN THE TwELVE YEAR SENTENCE (Rickenbacker ed. 1974). 
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pansive state parens patriae powers in education generally support the 
Cultural Transmission theory of education. 
The "other guy" approach is not universally accepted. Many feel 
that state intervention should be a matter of last resort. Psychologist 
Joseph Goldstein, for example, concluded his analysis on state supervi-
sion of parental autonomy in the health care field by noting that the 
lack of societal consensus regarding state intrusion into parental auton-
omy justifies a check on "the use of state power to impose highly per-
sonal values on those who do not share them."213 In a similar vein, 
Professor Robert Burt commented that there is a natural presumption 
favoring the parents and limiting state intervention into the parent-
child bond.214 
Under an expansive "other guy" approach, the state might well be 
able to justify a total prohibition of home instruction. Home instruc-
tion, after all, grants more responsibility to the family than any other 
educational alternative. This view is in conflict with the general trust 
accorded parents in the upbringing of their children, however.215 For 
example, the common law view presumed that the parents' natural af-
fection for their children as well as their knowledge and superior op-
portunities to discover the child's capabilities would ensure that the 
parents promoted the child's best interests. 216 
In addition to the parents' unique ability to act in the best interest of 
their children, children generally approve of their parents' actions and 
want to keep the child-parent bond strong.217 For example, one recent 
213. Goldstein, Medical Care for tlte Cltild at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Auton-
0"!1', 86 YALE L.J. 645, 670 (1977). 
214. According to Professor Burt: 
A presumption favoring parents corresponds both to the social reality that state child 
rearing interventions are inherently difficult enterprises and to the psychological reality 
that an intensely intimate bonding between parent and child lays the best developmental 
foundation for this society's most prized personality attributes. A court should view all 
state claims to contravene parental desires with the same skeptical eye-but it should be 
prepared to sanction all interventions that satisfy its generally applicable criteria. 
Burt, supra note 108, at 127. 
215. /d. 
216. See Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 Ill. 303, 308 (1877); see also references listed in 
Moskowitz, Parental Rights and State Education, 50 WASH. L. REv. 623, 623-26 (1975). 
217. See Burt, supra note 108, at 128-32; see also J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH 
oF LOVE 80 (1965) ("Efforts made to 'save' a child from his bad surroundings and to give him new 
standards are commonly of no avail, since it is his own parents, for good or ill, he values and with 
whom he is identified."). But see D. HOULGATE, CHILDREN, PATERNALISM, AND RIGHTS TO LIB-
ERTY, in HAVING CHILDREN (0. O'Neill & W. Ruddick, eels.) (arguing in favor of a mature child's 
right to self-development). 
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court decision recognized that "[a] child is not a creature of the state. A 
child's first allegiance is to his family and parental rights and responsi-
bilities in the education of children come before the state's."218 For the 
past fifteen years, courts have recognized the propriety of parental con-
trol and limited state intervention into family affairs on several consti-
tutional grounds.219 
The increasing recognition of parental authority limits but does not 
undercut the state's parens patriae authority in nonpublic education. 
The state clearly has a legitimate interest in ensuring that all children 
are afforded the opportunity to become viable members of contempo-
rary society. Yet, the state must demonstrate that its actions will serve 
this legitimate purpose before it interferes with the parent-child rela-
tionship. Robert Burt, looking at Supreme Court decisions protecting 
other "fundamental rights" from state intrusion, suggested the follow-
ing standard: "[I] Has the need for state intervention been convinc-
ingly identified, and [2] is there a close correspondence between that 
need and the means proposed to satisfy that need."2~0 In other words, 
"when the state contravenes parental decisions in child rearing with the 
claimed purpose of benefiting the child, the state must present a con-
vincing case that its intervention, in fact, will serve its professed 
goai."22I 
A state would be hard pressed to justify a total prohibition of home 
instruction under the Burt standard. North Carolina, in the .Duro law-
suit, contended that it " 'does not permit home instruction because [it] 
has no mechanism by which to assure that children in a home with 
their parents are provided access to any education whatsoever.' "222 
This justification seems spurious because the state could demand that 
home study students be taught by a capable teacher or pass competency 
examinations. In short, it would appear that the state could satisfy its 
parens patriae interest in education through less restrictive means than 
the total prohibition of the home study alternative. 
The state clearly has authority to impose some regulations on home 
study programs. It is, however, difficult to draw the line separating per-
218. Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 57-60, 203 N.W.2d 457, 483 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich. 
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). 
219. See supra note 93. 
220. Burt, supra note 108, at 127. 
221. Id. 
222. Duro v. District Attorney, No. 81-13-Civ.-2 at 6 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 20, 1982). 
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missible from intrusive regulations. Regulations governing core curric-
ulum, length of school day and school year, student reporting, and 
competency examinations are clearly constitutional. Expansive curric-
ulum requirements or state prescribed textbooks, however, are uncon-
stitutionaF23 The real difficulty lies in the evaluation of intermediate 
curriculum and teacher certification requirements. Teacher certifica-
tion is a particularly knotty issue because in many cases requiring certi-
fication will effectively foreclose the home study alternative. 
Considering that competency examinations can ensure adequate 
achievement prior to academic advancement, it would appear that 
teacher certification requirements that are so stringent as to preclude 
the home education option probably are unconstitutionaP24 
Competency examinations provide the best vehicle to balance the 
state's interest in an educated populace against a parent's interest in 
directing the upbringing of his children. 225 State objections to achieve-
ment tests are unconvincing as a policy matter. The state contends that 
its objective is not merely to identify those students who do not learn 
their lessons; rather, it is to promote the likelihood that the educational 
system will provide every child with the basic education to function 
effectively in society. Thus the State may view after-the-fact regula-
tions as an ill-fitted substitute for state-imposed educational standards. 
Underlying (and ultimately fatal to) this argument is a presumption 
that a substantial enough number of home study students will fail to 
justify state-imposed burdens on pluralism, religious liberty, and pa-
rental rights. The evidence, however, is to the contrary.226 If anything, 
it appears that parents who teach their children at home are doing a 
223. Court rulings on the analogous issue of the constitutionality of state regulations gov-
erning Christian day schools support this conclusion. 
224. The state can still require ad hoc determinations of competency. The state, however, 
probably cannot demand that parents comply with such formalistic criteria as receipt of a college 
diploma. 
225. For an alternative suggestion, see Note, Home Instruction: An Alternative to Institutional 
Education, 18 J. FAM. L. 353, 374-77 (1978-80) (recommending home visits and other types of 
professional evaluation). 
226. See Tax-Exempt Status of Pri11ate Schools: Hearings Bifore tlte Subcomm. on Oversight of 
tlte House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 554-56 (1979) (festimony of Dr. Paul 
Kienel, Executive Director of the Association of Christian Schools International). It is also worth 
noting that "the prosecutor on the trial of the Whisner case objected to the introduction of the 
Stanford Achievement Test scores on the Tabernacle Christian students as irrelevant and immate-
rial. Apparently, the State took the position that compliance with the minimum standards was 
indispensable to an adequate education." Rice, supra note 27, at 886. 
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better job than the public schools.227 Courts that have addressed this 
issue in the control of state regulation of Christian schools are evenly 
divided on the adequacy of competency tests issue.228 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to provide a hard and fast determination of what the 
state can and cannot do in its regulation of home study programs. Yet, 
neither the state's communitarian interest in a well-functioning open 
political system, or its parens patriae interest in the eventual economic 
self-sufficiency of its youth, is sufficiently strong to justify a total prohi-
bition of home instruction.229 A parent's right to direct the religious 
upbringing of his child should carry with it the right to a meaningful 
home study option. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court passed up 
the opportunity to review the .Duro case. Until the Supreme Court 
chooses to review this issue, it appears that the basic questions concern-
ing parental authority in the instruction of their children will be dis-
cerned through an entangled body of state court decisions. 
227. See Heard, Church-Related Schools: Resistance to Stale Control Increases, Educ. Wk., 
Feb. 17, 1982, at 1, 10, 18. 
228. Compare Kentucky State Bd. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979) (encourages the 
use of such tests) with State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 816-17,301 N.W.2d 571,579-
80 (1981) (criticizes the use of such tests). 
"Christian schools have generally been willing to submit their 'product' voluntarily to reason-
able evaluation by the State through achievement testing." Note, State Regulation of Private Reli· 
gious Schools in North Carolina-A Model Approach, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 405, 416 (1980). 
Christian school leaders, however, have expressed concern that the state may impose otherwise 
impermissible curriculum requirements through extensive testing. See Ball, supra note 13, at 337-
38. It should also be noted that many Christian school leaders and some courts contend that the 
state can satisfy its interest in education by requiring that Christian school students take and 
perform satisfactorily on a nationally recognized achievement test. See Kentucky State Bd. v. 
Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Ky. 1979); Devins, supra note 93. This position, however, has been 
rebuked by some commentators and courts. See, e.g., State v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 
813-17, 301 N.W.2d 571, 578-80 (Neb. 1981). 
229. For a similar conclusion, see Note, The Right to Education: A Constitutional Analysis_ 44 
U. CIN. L. REv. 796, 809 (1975) ("At the very least the substantive due process theory calls into 
question the constitutionality of compulsory education for many children."); Note, Home Educa-
tion in America: Parental Rights Reasserted, 49 UMKC L. REv. 191, 206 ("any compulsory educa-
tion statute which does not allow [or places severe limits on] home instruction ..• should be 
struck down as violative of the Constitution"). 
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DANIEL M. BUESCHER 
RExFoRD H. CARUTHERS 
MICHAEL K. COLLINS 
DAVID L. CORNFELD 
DAVID w. DETJEN 
WALTER E. DIGGS, JR. 
GLEN A. FEATHERSTUN 
ROBERT A. FINKE 
FRANCIS M. GAFFNEY 
FACULTY ADVISOR: RONALD M . LEVIN 
STAFF AsSISTANT: AMY RUPRECHT-BELT 
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JULES B. GERARD 
JEROME A. GROSS 
DONALD L. GUNNELS 
MICHAEL HOLTZMAN 
GEORGE A. JENSEN 
HARRY w. JONES 
STEPHEN C. JONES 
LLOYD R. KOENIG 
ALAN C. KoHN 
HARRY W. KROEGER 
FRED L. KUHLMANN 
PAUL M. LAURENZA 
WARREN R . MAICHEL 
R . MARK McCAREINS 
JAMES A. McCoRD 
DAVID L. MILLAR 
GREGO R. NARBER 
DAVID W. DESTING 
NORMAN C. PARKER 
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER 
ALAN E. PoPKIN 
RoBERT L. PRooST 
ORVILLE RICHARDSON 
W. MUNRO RoBERTS 
STANLEY M. ROSENBLUM 
EDWIN M . SCHAEFFER, JR. 
A. E. S. SCHMID 
KARL P. SPENCER 
JAMES W. STARNES 
JAMES V, STEPLETON 
MAURlCE L . STEWART 
WAYNE D. STRUBLE 
ROBERT E. TRAUTMANN 
DOMINIC TROIANI 
ROBERT M. WASHBURN 
ROBERT S. WEININGER 
JUDITH BARRY WISH 
WAYNE B. WRIGHT 
PAUL L. YANOWITCII 
